Explaining U.S. and German foreign policy decisions toward Ukraine

Abstract

This thesis explains U.S. and German foreign policy decisions regarding Ukraine over the course of 1992-2015. Using theoretical models of foreign policy analysis and a method of structured-focused comparison, the research provides multi-causal explanations of crucial U.S. and German foreign policy decisions regarding Ukraine. They include the 1992-1994 Ukrainian nuclear disarmament, the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit, and the Western response to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict that began in 2014. The thesis provides a detailed comparative analysis of key factors that caused the emergence of American-German disunity regarding Ukraine. It concludes that divergent U.S. and German decisions regarding Ukraine appear in the dynamics of their changing power statuses and national security interests, as well as their dominant ideas and domestic politics. The inconsistency regarding Ukraine emerges when one or both states perceive Ukraine as a subsidiary part of each country's bilateral relations with Russia. The results of the research are critical in evaluating U.S. and German efforts to prevent further escalation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, avoid a new East-West confrontation, and ensure the reliability of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. The results of the research also provide important background for the further development of the American-Ukrainian and German-Ukrainian strategic partnership.