Confronting Entrenched Insurgents
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Authors
Kress, Moshe
Kaplan, Edward
Szechtman, Roberto
Subjects
counterinsurgency
optimal force allocation
Lanchester models
value of intelligence
game theory
Hezbollah/Israel conflict
optimal force allocation
Lanchester models
value of intelligence
game theory
Hezbollah/Israel conflict
Advisors
Date of Issue
2010
Date
March - April 2010
Publisher
INFORMS
Language
Abstract
During counterinsurgency operations, government forces with superior firepower confront weaker low-signature insurgents. Under what conditions should government (Blue) forces attack insurgent (Red) strongholds? How should the government allocate its force across different strongholds when the insurgents’ threat to the Blue civilian population must be taken into account? How should the government respond to “smart” insurgents who anticipate the government’s optimal plan of attack and prepare accordingly? How do the results change when the government takes Red civilian casualties resulting from attacks on insurgent strongholds into account? This article addresses these questions. Using Lanchester models modified to account for imperfect intelligence, we formulate an optimal force allocation problem for the government and develop a knapsack approximation that has tight error bounds. We also model a sequential force allocation game between the insurgents and the government and solve for its equilibrium. When the government has perfect intelligence, in equilibrium the insurgents concentrate their force in a single stronghold that the government either attacks or not depending upon the resulting casualty count. Otherwise, under reasonable assumptions regarding the government’s behavior and intelligence capabilities, it is optimal for the insurgents to “spread out” in a way that maximizes the number of soldiers required to win all battles. If the government worries about Red civilian casualties, the insurgents have a strong incentive to blend in with the Red civilian population, because this can prevent government attacks while allowing the insurgents to inflict casualties on Blue civilians. Such strategic behavior makes it harder for the government to protect its citizens from insurgent attacks.
Type
Article
Description
Operations Research, V. 58, No. 2, pp 329-341.
The article of record as published may be located at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.1090.0728
The article of record as published may be located at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.1090.0728
Series/Report No
Department
Operations Research (OR)
Organization
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
Funding
Format
Citation
2010 “Confronting Entrenched Insurgents”, (with E. Kaplan and R. Szechtman), Operations Research, V. 58, No. 2, pp 329-341.
Distribution Statement
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.