Abacus of frozen conflicts
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Authors
Karimov, Reshad.
Subjects
Advisors
Freeman, Michael E.
Date of Issue
2010-06
Date
Publisher
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Language
Abstract
One of the central topics of international relations study is the function of military threats as a mean to deter international crises and war. Rational choice models provide the groundwork for theorizing circumstances under which conventional deterrence is likely to thrive or fail. According to Paul Huth, rational deterrence theorists have focused on four sets of variables: the balance of military forces, costly signaling and bargaining behavior, reputations, and interests at stake. By using the case of the Russian-Georgian War of August of 2008, one can argue that an actor's perception, in addition to signaling, is another essential variable for successful deterrence.
Type
Thesis
Description
Series/Report No
Department
Electrical Engineering
Organization
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
Funder
Format
xiv, 59 p. : col. maps ;
Citation
Distribution Statement
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.