CHINA'S LESSONS FROM THE RUSSO-UKRAINE WAR APPLIED TO A TAIWAN CONTINGENCY

Abstract

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has publicly stated its aspirations of subsuming pseudo-independent Taiwan under its formal control—by force if necessary. Several U.S. intelligence, military, and government authorities have asserted that the PRC aspires to possess the capability to achieve this forced unification of Taiwan with the Chinese mainland by the year 2027. The Russian invasion of Ukraine represents the closest modern analogy to a theoretical Chinese-forced subjugation of Taiwan, making it a critical case study for Chinese military, economic, and political observers to analyze in pursuit of improving their preparations for a Taiwan contingency. In many ways, the Russo-Ukraine War serves as a cautionary tale for China, while in others it reassures China to continue pursuing familiar efforts in preparation for forced unification and its probable consequences. Using a DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic) framework, this thesis aims to primarily utilize Chinese-originating sources discussing the Russo-Ukraine War to understand what China is truly learning from the conflict—and perhaps more importantly, what concerns Russia's invasion raises for Chinese aspirations toward Taiwan and the all-too-soon year of 2027.