Opportunity in dange : Manstein's East Front strategy from 19 Nov 1942 to 18 Mar 1943
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Authors
Bolstad, Steven B.
Subjects
Strategy
Manstein
German Army
East Front
World War II
Manstein
German Army
East Front
World War II
Advisors
Stolfi, Russel H.S
Date of Issue
1991-06
Date
June 1991
Publisher
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Language
en_US
Abstract
In the 1990s the United States Armed Forces will be asked by its leaders to do more with less. This represents a significant turn from the policies of the last decade. During World War Two the German Army operated effectively under similar policy constraints. There are many lessons in strategic planning that can be learned from Field Marshal Erich von Manstein's operations during the Winter of 1942-43. He was able to grasp tremendous opportunity amid extreme strategic danger. He decisively changed the strategic situation on the Eastern Front over a four month period. This thesis addresses the following questions. What factors enabled him to operate so effectively? What hindered him? What decisions did he make, when and why? How might leaders today make similar decisions under similar circumstances and be as successful? The answers to these questions will be of great value to the United States Armed Forces as they restructure themselves for the 1990s.
Type
Thesis
Description
Series/Report No
Department
National Security Affairs (NSA)
Organization
Naval Postgraduate School
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
Funding
Format
Citation
Distribution Statement
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.