Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (PASCC)

Series:
Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (PASCC)

Series Type

Degree-Earning Works

Full item page

Publication Search Results

Now showing 1 - 10 of 11

Future World of Illicit Nuclear Trade, Mitigating the Threat
(Center on Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013-07-29) Albright, David; Stricker, Andrea; Wood, Houston; Center on Contemporary Conflict (CCC)
Of the roughly two dozen countries that have pursued or obtained nuclear weapons during the last fifty years, almost all of them depended importantly on foreign supplies. As a short term projection over the next five to ten years, illicit nuclear trade is likely to be conducted by several nations seeking nuclear weapons or wanting to maintain existing nuclear weapons arsenals or capabilities. Additional states in regions of proliferation concern may utilize smuggling methods to acquire advanced, ostensibly civilian, nuclear technology including uranium enrichment and plutonium production and separation capabilities. And despite many recent, particularly United States-led, successes, stopping this trade will remain difficult. Absent mitigating actions, several existing or expected trends are projected to make it easier for smugglers to succeed in acquiring nuclear and nuclear-related goods and technology. Future illicit trade can be stopped through measures taken today as long as the political will is there to foresee and address future threats. A range of countermeasures aimed at mitigating or eliminating these future threats must be employed today to stop them from emerging in the next five to ten years. Preventing the future world of illicit trade is imperative to U.S. and international security and to the creation of a world safer from the spread and use of nuclear weapons.
North Korea's Evolving Nuclear Strategy
(2015-08) Smith, Shane; Center on Contemporary Conflict (CCC)
Over the past two decades, North Korea’s nuclear program has grown from a proliferation problem to a military threat to its neighbors and the United States. The country is now estimated to possess enough fissile material to build anywhere from six to about thirty nuclear weapons, depending largely on how much highly enriched uranium it has produced, and is poised to grow its stockpile, perhaps dramatically, over the coming years. North Korea has conducted three increasingly powerful nuclear tests since 2006 as well as a series of missile launches, suggesting to some that it could sooner or later target the US homeland. If that were not enough, the North has made excessively bold and even preemptive nuclear threats under the leadership of Kim Jong Un.
Assessing the impact of low nuclear numbers on strategic stability: a regional analysis
(Monterey, Califormia, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013-03) Moltz, James Clay; Center on Contemporary Conflict (CCC); National Security Affairs (NSA)
Coercive Nuclear Campaigns in the 21st Century; Understanding Adversary Incentives and Options for Nuclear Escalation
(Georgetown University, 2013-01) Lieber, Keir; Press, Daryl; Center on Contemporary Conflict (CCC)
"This report examines why and how regional powers armed with nuclear weapons may employ those weapons coercively against the United States or U.S. allies during a conventional war. We argue that the problem of intra-Ââ€ war deterrence -- preventing nuclear-Ââ€ armed adversaries from escalating during a conventional conflict -- is arguably the most important deterrence challenge facing the United States in the 21st century. The strategic environment facing the United States, its allies, and its potential adversaries has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. For nearly four decades, the United States and its NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies planned to use nuclear weapons to defend themselves from a major Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. The armies of the Warsaw Pact were perceived to be too formidable to confront with a strictly conventional defense -- at least at spending levels that would be acceptable to the North Atlantic alliance. Nuclear weapons were thus NATO's 'trump card': NATO planned to employ nuclear weapons coercively during a war to raise the costs and risks to the Warsaw Pact and thereby convince them to halt their military operations before they could inflict a total defeat on NATO. Today, the global balance of power is reversed. Now U.S. military forces are the most formidable, and potential U.S. adversaries need trump cards of their own to stalemate the United States. This reversal in the balance of power helps explain why the United States now seeks to delegitimize nuclear weapons and reduce their role in the world. Unfortunately, the same conditions that once made NATO rely on nuclear weapons will now likely compel other countries -- including several potential U.S. adversaries -- to rely upon nuclear weapons."
Scoping Future Nuclear Proliferation Risks: Leveraging Emerging Trends in Socio-Cultural Modeling and Analysis
(2016-04-01) Johnson, Jeannie L.; Center on Contemporary Conflict (CCC)
The key objective of this project has been to identify and then refine cutting-edge sociocultural analytic models tailored to anticipate aspiring WMD actors and identify points of leverage within their national communities. In doing so, we hope to supply insights for strategic planners seeking to thwart, disrupt, or productively shift nuclear weapons activity. In order to achieve that end, our team: ✦ (Section I) Combined key features of two socio-cultural models successfully employed within the intelligence community into a framework designed to identify and capture critical components of WMD decision making within a regime; ✦ (Section II) Commissioned a set of papers employing the Cultural Topography Analytic Framework (CTAF) in order to draw out key insights for the effective application of assurance, deterrence, dissuasion, and denial, with an eye toward an era in which the US may be engaging both an ally and an adversary at the same time. These papers delivered specific country insights in three key areas: ✦ Key cultural components of the narratives driving WMD decisionmaking within the regime; ✦ Decision vectors that may provide windows of opportunity for US policymakers; ✦ Tailored policy recommendations for the way ahead in engaging this regime. ✦ (Section III) Drawing on our collective findings, this report offers primary takeaways and promising avenues for the way ahead in anticipating nuclear activity and forging tailored strategies in order to achieve US policy ends.
Singapore-US Strategic Dialogue on Biosecurity
(2014-07) Center on Contemporary Conflict (CCC)
Singapore is poised to be a critical partner to the US in minimizing biosecurity challenges in Southeast Asia. As a nation, it is vulnerable to both emerging infectious disease and potential terrorism in the region. In addition to its geographical importance within the Asia-Pacific region, Singapore is a rising powerhouse in biotechnology, having invested $13.2B in biotech R&D from 2011-2015. As a result, it has become an attractive site for international biotechnology companies like Novartis, as well as world-class research universities. It is home to government and academic expertise capable of identifying and responding to biosecurity challenges. Its expertise is, in many ways, complementary to that of the US in these realms.
U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue 2014 Report
(PASCC, 2014-02) Kapus, S. Paul; Jacobs, Ryan; French, Ryan; Center on Contemporary Conflict (CCC)
The Naval Postgraduate School Center on Contemporary Conflict (CCC) is the research wing of the Department of National Security Affairs (NSA) and specializes in the study of international relations, security policy, and regional studies. One of the CCC’s programs is the Project Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC). PASCC operates as a program planning and implementation office, research center, and intellectual clearinghouse for the execution of analysis and future-oriented studies and dialogues for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
Nuclear dynamics in a multipolar strategic ballistic missile defense world
(Federation of American Scientists (FAS), 2017-07) Ferguson, Charles D.; MacDonald, Bruce W.; Center on Contemporary Conflict (CCC)
We are focused on understanding the nuclear dynamics of a world in which more than one nation is developing and deploying ballistic missile defense systems for strategic purposes. Strategic purposes could mean for defense of a national territory, defending command and control centers, protecting nuclear-armed ballistic missiles to help ensure retaliatory forces, or providing political cover for development of anti-satellite weapons that could target strategic military communications as well as command and control satellites. Strategic BMD is distinguishable from theater missile defenses (TMD), which are designed for defending smaller areas or for providing “point” protection of military units. Strategic BMD is also typically designed to counter long-range ballistic missiles, such as intercontinental range ballistic missiles (ICBMs), especially in the context of the United States wanting protection against adversaries who are an ocean’s distance away or farther. However, in the context of neighboring nuclear adversaries such as India and Pakistan, strategic BMD would target shorter-range ballistic missiles while India would also consider strategic BMD for protection against medium- to intermediate-range Chinese ballistic missiles. In sum, strategic BMD is not so much about the range of missile threats but rather the context of national security purposes.
Next steps towards a Middle East free of chemical weapons
(Arizona State University, 2017-03) Kittrie, Orde F.; Center on Contemporary Conflict (CCC)
A “Track II” Middle East Chemical Weapons Task Force (Task Force) comprised of policy and technical experts from ten countries in the Middle East convened in 2016-17 to discuss chemical weapons acquisition and use in the region and to identify next steps to more effectively address this threat. The Task Force reached agreement on this joint statement and on the attached list of 47 different potential regional capacity building and other cooperative steps to prevent, detect and respond to chemical weapons acquisition and use in the region. The aspirational goal of establishing the Middle East as a region free of chemical weapons is shared in principle by most governments in the region. All but two countries in the region are parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the two have expressed interest in joining under certain circumstances. However, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has reported that many countries in the region which are parties to the CWC have yet to adopt the national laws and regulations necessary to implement their CWC obligations. In addition, most countries in the region have yet to implement their relevant legal obligations pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1540.
Future opportunities for bioengagement in the MENA region
(American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), 2013-10) Berger, Kavita M.; Husbands, Jo; Sture, Judi; Khan, Erum; Cohen, Murray; Center on Contemporary Conflict (CCC)