Coercive disarmament demobilization and reintegration (DDR): can it be successful?

Abstract

In a post-conflict situation, a strategy of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) is critical to achieving sustainable peace. There are three main DDR approaches: the cooperative, successful against macroinsecurities; the integrated, emphasizes micro-insecurities; and the coercive, commonly a failure. Today, coercive DDR programs are increasingly common, which creates a need to understand why many think they always fail, and how the programs can be improved. This thesis conducts a comparative study of three coercive DDR programs, comparing within and across the programs to ascertain conditions that lead to both success and failure. Haiti 1994- 2004 is an example of coercive DDR with short-term success but long-term failure. Haiti 2004-2007 is an example of the unique challenges implementers confront when targeting criminal gangs. Albania 1997-1999 is an example of how coercive DDR achieves long-term success by using a community-based approach. The study finds that shortterm success is sustainable when the terms of DDR are acceptable to the target group. Security, economic guarantees, and community involvement are critical to the success of coercive DDR. Contrary to expectations, coercive DDR programs can succeed, but require careful integration of local actors and local situations, a condition that is often absent.