Two dilemmas and vicious cycle of confrontation on the continuity of the division of the Korean Peninsula

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Authors
Lee, Young Seok.
Subjects
Alliance Security Dilemma
Prisoner's Dilemma
U.S.-ROK alliance
PRC-DPRK alliance
U.S.-PRC Rivalry
ROK-DPRK Rivalry
Alliance
Rivalry
Reconciliation
Reunification
Advisors
Huntley, Wade L.
Date of Issue
2011-12
Date
December 2011
Publisher
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Language
Abstract
The continuing division of the Korean Peninsula is the ongoing feature in inter-Korean relations, with repeating cycles of confrontations and conciliations. This thesis identifies contributing factors to the ongoing division from the intricately entangled security relations between the U.S., PRC, ROK and DPRK: rivalry and alliance. While struggling for security, they become either a security provider or a threat to other players. Each relational linkage provides an imperative security framework for the two Koreas, but these also have paradoxical security implications-"two dilemmas"-for inter-Korean reconciliation. In the relations of two sets of rivalries-the U.S.-PRC and the ROK-DPRK, the Prisoner's Dilemma explains how the rational player's interest-seeking behavior produces deadlock, even though reconciliation provides better results. Also, in the relations of two sets of alliances, the U.S.-ROK and the PRC-DPRK, the alliance security dilemma explains how divergent interests and threat perceptions between allies work against any reconciliation policy. Moreover, the interaction of rivalry and alliance produces paradoxical security dynamics among the four players, and drives them into the vicious cycle of confrontations. In short, these intricately intertwined and dilemma contained security relations induce significant conflict between the four players for either confrontational or conciliatory policies.
Type
Description
Series/Report No
Department
National Security Affairs (NSA)
Organization
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
Funder
Format
xviii, 127 p. ; 28 cm.
Citation
Distribution Statement
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.
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