NATO's response to the 11 September 2001 terrorism : lessons learned

Abstract

This thesis analyzes NATO's decisions and actions in response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States and assesses the probable future role of the Alliance in combating international terrorism. In September-October 2001 the United States chose to lead a coalition against the Al Qaida terrorists and their supporters in Afghanistan instead of ceding the initiative to NATO. The necessity for rapid decisions and action, the military capabilities gap between the United States and the European allies, and the lessons of NATO's air campaign in the 1999 Kosovo crisis probably led the United States to make this choice. NATO's contributions to the campaign against terrorism have included sending Airborne Warning and Control Systems aircraft to the United States, deploying naval forces to the Eastern Mediterranean, and conducting preventive action against terrorist groups acting within or from the Balkans. NATO's responses to the 11 September attacks, the unconventional and asymmetric threat posed by international terrorism, and the distinct contributions that the military can make in combating terrorism support the main hypothesis examined in this study: that NATO may be unable to play more than specific limited roles in the fight against international terrorism.