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dc.contributor.authorRussell, James A.
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-24T22:44:52Z
dc.date.available2012-08-24T22:44:52Z
dc.date.issued2009-04-01
dc.identifier.citationStrategic Insights, v.8, issue 2 (April 2009)
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/11078
dc.descriptionThis article appeared in Strategic Insights, v.8, issue 2 (April 2009)en_US
dc.descriptionApproved for public display, distribution unlimiteden_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper addresses the prospect that nuclear weapons could be used in the Middle East – breaking the so-called “tabooâ€ against the use of these weapons since the United States dropped a nuclear bomb on Nagasaki on August 9, 1945 and which remained unbroken throughout the Cold War and continues to endure. It argues that unstable dynamics of the coercive bargaining framework surrounding Iran’s nuclear program may be pushing the world closer toward the use of nuclear weapons than is generally realized – perhaps closer than any time since the Cuban missile crisis1 – and proposes a number of near- and longer-term scenarios to illustrate the ways in which structural uncertainties in the regional interstate bargaining framework could result in the use of nuclear weapons.en_US
dc.publisherMonterey, California. Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.relation.ispartofStrategic Insights, v.8, issue 2(April 2009)
dc.relation.ispartofseriesStrategic Insights
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.titleStrategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East; Strategic Insights, v. 8, issue 2 (April 2009)en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.contributor.corporateCenter for Contemporary Conflict
dc.contributor.corporateNaval Postgraduate School (U.S.) Monterey, California


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