African Conflicts in the Early 21st Century; Strategic Insights, v. 10, Special issue (October 2011), 99-104. Topic: Global Trends and Future Warfare ; Part III: New Actors and Belligerents

Abstract

In this essay we will be placing ourselves in a perspective where, out of the four possibilities outlined in the NIC's Tomorrow's Security Challenges: The Defense Implications of Emerging Global Trends report, we will consider a combination of two of the global trends presented: a rise in non-state networks and a fragmented international system. The one scenario we cannot see as relevant overall is the concert of powers, a choice it would take too long to justify within the framework of such a short paper. As for the possibility of seeing a return to great power confrontation, even though it may be a more realistic systemic possibility than the emergence of a global concern, it is hard to foresee significant great power confrontation arising in Africa. The emerging powers, particularly China, will not fight for Africa. Even if this trend occurs - and we cannot see it dominate - it will most probably create conditions similar to those of the 19th century. The Soviet Union's Vladimir Lenin was sure that an inter-imperialist war would come out of colonial competition in Africa.1 It did not, and when the great inter-imperialist war came, it came out of a European confrontation. If renewed great power rivalry were to bring about a major military confrontation in the 21st century, the trigger is much more likely to be found in the Middle Eastern or Asia than in Africa.