A comparative analysis of Naval Surface Reserve Force Training and the relevance of the Training and Administration of Reserve (TAR) program

Abstract

This thesis analyzes the shifting roles of Training and Administration of Reserve (TAR) officers, particularly in terms of the necessity of maintaining a separate community to manage Surface Reserve Force training. As the mission of the Naval Reserve becomes more integrated with the active forces, the requirement for full-time management of Surface Reserve Centers by TARs is questionable. The study describes closer reserve integration with the Fleet, and analyzes the current role and utility of the TAR program related to changes in training. An overview of the organizational structure and role of both the Naval Reserve and the TAR program through the Persian Gulf War is provided. Changes to the Surface training program post-Desert Storm are addressed, as well as proposals for organizational structure changes. Conclusions regarding the value added of the surface TAR program include the following: the policy to maintain a Reserve Center in every state is problematic; the Surface Reserve Force's organizational structure and processes are inconsistent; and numerous management information systems and administrative procedures have created barriers to the active force's ability to readily identify reserve resources.