Euros, pounds and Albion at arms: European monetary policy and British defense in the 21st century

Abstract

In the United Kingdom, a central issue of contemporary foreign policy is whether or not to enter into full membership of the European Monetary Union (EMU). Membership has profound implications for the development of the European Union (EU) and the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and potentially upon the much heralded Anglo-American 'special relationship'. On a practical level, excluding the political implications of membership, joining the EMU means surrendering the pound sterling for the euro and in doing so the British would also surrender control of monetary policy. This thesis will examine the historical links between British defence and monetary policy and argues that there are strong historical bonds that link the two in the political psychology of Britain. This link has created for Britain twin nationalistic icons in the pound and the military. This thesis illustrates that a paradox exists in that membership in the EMU would improve British defence spending and yet nationalistic forces resist membership. At the same time, forces in Britain in favor of monetary integration, unable to accomplish it but pressured to show they are dedicated to the project of European integration, paradoxically commit to further defence integration thought the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU.