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dc.contributor.advisorLavoy, Peter R.
dc.contributor.authorOrcutt, Daniel J.
dc.dateJune 2004
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-14T17:32:13Z
dc.date.available2012-03-14T17:32:13Z
dc.date.issued2004-06
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/1537
dc.description.abstractNorth Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons has shaken the foundations of U.S. policy in Northeast Asia. Because of North Korea's record of state-sponsored terrorism, illicit activities, human rights violations, arms sales, and fiery rhetoric, its development of operational nuclear weapons is deeply disturbing. Although most agree North Korea should not possess nuclear weapons, nobody has a solution. This thesis evaluates three U.S. policy options for North Korean nuclear weapons: incentive-based diplomacy, coercive diplomacy, or military force. It analyzes them according to four criteria: the impact on North Korea's nuclear weapons, the impact on its neighbors (China, Japan, and South Korea), U.S. policy costs, and the precedent for future proliferation. This thesis shows that diplomacy will fail to achieve U.S. objectives for three reasons: lack of trust, DPRK reluctance to permit transparency, and the difficulty of conducting multilateral coercive diplomacy. Ultimately, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's question must be answered: "What price is the United States willing to pay to disarm North Korean nuclear weapons?" If Washington is unwilling to back a threat of military force, it should not risk coercive diplomacy. Likewise, U.S. leaders may need to decide between maintaining the U.S.-ROK alliance and eliminating North Korean nuclear weapons.en_US
dc.description.urihttp://archive.org/details/carrotstickorsle109451537
dc.format.extentxiv, 85 p.en_US
dc.publisherMonterey California. Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.subject.lcshNuclear weaponsen_US
dc.subject.lcshKorea (North)en_US
dc.titleCarrot, stick, or sledgehammer: U.S. policy options for North Korean nuclear weaponsen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.secondreaderWirtz, James J.
dc.contributor.corporateNaval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of National Security Affairs
dc.subject.authorNorth Koreaen_US
dc.subject.authorNuclear weaponsen_US
dc.subject.authorCoercive diplomacyen_US
dc.subject.authorBrinkmanshipen_US
dc.subject.authorRationalityen_US
dc.subject.authorKim Jong-Ilen_US
dc.subject.authorChinaen_US
dc.subject.authorJapanen_US
dc.subject.authorSouth Koreaen_US
dc.subject.authorUnited Statesen_US
dc.subject.authorPolicy optionsen_US
dc.subject.authorNuclear proliferationen_US
dc.subject.authorMilitary forceen_US
dc.subject.authorNortheast Asiaen_US
dc.description.serviceMajor, United States Air Forceen_US
etd.thesisdegree.nameM.A. in Security Studies (Defense Decision-Making and Planning)en_US
etd.thesisdegree.levelMastersen_US
etd.thesisdegree.disciplineSecurity Studies (Defense Decision-Making and Planning)en_US
etd.thesisdegree.grantorNaval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
etd.verifiednoen_US
dc.description.distributionstatementApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


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