The Soviet navy and superpower foreign policy in the Middle East: a study in the political application of naval force.
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Authors
Joslin, Leslie Allen
Subjects
Advisors
Skurnik, W.A.E.
Beer, Lawrence W.
Date of Issue
1974-11-19
Date
November 19, 1974
Publisher
Language
en_US
Abstract
Originally deployed forward in the waters of the
Middle East only a decade ago to defend the Soviet homeland
against Western strategic attack from the sea, the
Soviet Navy, since the Six Day War of 1967 has become an
increasingly important instrument of Moscow's foreign
policy as well as an increasingly significant influence
upon American foreign policy in the region,
Application of the concept of armed naval suasion—
an explanation of the political application of naval force
as it seems to influence national actors in international
arena situations short of war—to available empirical data
both facilitates demonstration of the Soviet Navy's evolution
as an instrument of foreign policy in the Middle East
and contributes to the determination of appropriate American
policy responses to the challenge which that navy as
such continues to pose to United States interests in the
region.
Despite a few setbacks such as that in Egypt during
1972, the growing perception of Soviet naval ascendancy
resulting from Moscow's resilient political application of
naval force, albeit somewhat unjustified, has succeeded in
significantly strengthening the Soviet strategic position
and seriously challenging the interests of the United
States in the region. Application of the naval suasion
concept to the problem of ascertaining the general nature
of appropriate policy responses to this challenge indicates
that development and deployment of a naval force structure
credible enough to evoke suasion effects as required while
minimizing the potentially counterproductive political
effects of such a force is essential to the successful pursuit
of American foreign policy in the Kiddie East. While
overreliance on a weak "policy of surrogation" and maintenance
of the no-longer-politically-viable Middle East
Force are determined to be inappropriate responses, retention
and revitalization of a modified U. S. Sixth Fleet in
the Mediterranean Sea and the continuation of a credible-intermittent
American naval presence in the Indian Ocean
supported by a modest facility on Diego Garcia—both of
which could be reinforced in time of crisis to effectively
exercise naval suasion—are shown to be components of an
appropriate American policy response to the political
challenge of the Soviet Navy. The probable future of continued
political application of Soviet naval force in the
Middle East will require the continued presence of the
U. S. Navy to support American diplomacy in the region.
Type
Thesis
Description
This thesis document was issued under the authority of another institution, not NPS. At the time it was written, a copy was added to the NPS Library Collection for reasons not now known. It has been included in the digital archive for its historical value to NPS. Not believed to be a CIVINS (Civilian Institutions) title.
Series/Report No
Department
Political Science
Organization
University of Colorado
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Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.