Korean unification: a game theoretical and bargaining analysis

Abstract

Since 1948 a stalemate has existed between North and South Korea on the issue of unification. Although discussions were held on the subject in 1972 and 1979, no substantive changes have occurred in the situation for 35 years. Thus, new approaches that could increase the possibility of agreement between North and South Korea must be developed. This thesis sees a game theoretical model based on the Prisoner's Dilemma to analyze the situation and provide strategy recommendations that can help alter the status quo. This theoretical model will provide policymakers with an insight into the problems involved in moving towards unification. The role that the U.S., Japan, USSR, and the PRC have in the unification process is also analyzed using this game theoretical model. It concludes that: the time to act is now, the initiative for unification must come from inside Korea, and that a substantive increase in communication and cooperation is critical if unification is to occur.