A cost/benefit matrix model of nuclear deterrence

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Author
Barbero, Mark
Date
1975-03Advisor
Abbey, D.L.
Second Reader
Boger, Dan C.
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This thesis develops a cost/benefit matrix model of deterrence processes. The model is designed to assist analysis of complex multi-nation interactions when an issue vital to the national survival of each participant is in the balance. A variety of instructions are examined utilizing the model to see if deterrence exists. The analysis of the various interactions results in the conclusion that deterrence exists when an assured destruction capability exists. Further, deterrence is lost in certain cases when the assured destruction capability is not maintained.
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This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.Collections
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