The probability of accidental nuclear war: a graphical model of the ballistic missile early warning system.
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Authors
Marsh, Barbara Y. Diegel
Subjects
accidental nuclear war
launch-on-warning
launch-under-attack
ballistic missile early warning system
NORAD
early warning system
false alarms
launch-on-warning
launch-under-attack
ballistic missile early warning system
NORAD
early warning system
false alarms
Advisors
Weir, Maurice D.
Gafford, Jack B.
Date of Issue
1985-03
Date
March 1985
Publisher
Language
en_US
Abstract
Six false alarms occurred at NORAD in 1978, 1979, and
1980. These false alarms subsequently regenerated interest
in launch policies and the increased possibility of accidental
nuclear war, which motivated this investigation. We
construct a new model to address several questions: What is
the sequence of events and reasonable timing between events
in the missile warning system? How much time do decision
makers have to respond to a threat? What effects do United
States launch policies have on decision-making time? How
likely is accidental nuclear war?
The results show that accidental nuclear war is not very
probable with launch-under-attack, but significantly more
likely if the United States adopts a launch-on-warning
policy. The final decision and responsibility to use these
policies, once they are implemented, rests entirely with the
President of the United States.
Type
Thesis
Description
Series/Report No
Department
Operations Research
Organization
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
Funding
Format
Citation
Distribution Statement
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.