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dc.contributor.advisorLavoy, Peter R.
dc.contributor.authorDewan, Jay P.
dc.dateMarch 2005
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-14T17:34:46Z
dc.date.available2012-03-14T17:34:46Z
dc.date.issued2005-03
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/2295
dc.description.abstractIndia has made a concerted effort to upgrade its ISR, precision strike, and missile defense capabilities as it competes with China and Pakistan for regional power. The Phalcon Airborne Warning and Control System, Su-30MKI fighter-bomber aircraft, and S-300PMU surface-to-air missile system are some examples of the new capabilities India is acquiring. I argue that if India continues its military modernization, Pakistan will become more insecure. The increase in the conventional military capabilities gap will likely upset the existing balance of power in South Asia, leading to a regional arms race, lowering the nuclear threshold, and increasing instability in the region. The strategic stability/tactical instability paradox that exists between two nuclear countries may lead them to engage in "small" wars. India's increasing military capabilities may encourage it to conduct a preventive strike against Pakistan. In such a climate, a regional arms race eventually may lead Pakistan to establish a "hair-trigger" nuclear posture. India's effort to achieve a significantly superior conventional military force over Pakistan paradoxically may reduce Indian security by causing greater instability, and possibly lead to nuclear war. Regional stability is enhanced to the extent that there is a rough conventional military balance between India and Pakistan.en_US
dc.description.urihttp://archive.org/details/howwillindimilit109452295
dc.format.extentx, 77 p.en_US
dc.publisherMonterey, California. Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.subject.lcshBalance of poweren_US
dc.subject.lcshArms raceen_US
dc.subject.lcshIndiaen_US
dc.subject.lcshPakistanen_US
dc.subject.lcshNuclear warfareen_US
dc.subject.lcshNuclear crisis stabilityen_US
dc.subject.lcshNuclear crisis controlen_US
dc.subject.lcshSouth Asiaen_US
dc.subject.lcshNuclear arms controlen_US
dc.titleHow will the Indian military's upgrade and modernization of its ISR, precision strike, and missile defense affect the stability in South Asia?en_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.secondreaderKhan, Feroz
dc.contributor.corporateNaval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of National Security Affairs
dc.subject.author"Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance"en_US
dc.subject.authorISRen_US
dc.subject.authorPrecision strikeen_US
dc.subject.authorMissile defenseen_US
dc.subject.authorStabilityen_US
dc.subject.authorInstabilityen_US
dc.subject.authorIndiaen_US
dc.subject.authorPakistanen_US
dc.subject.authorChinaen_US
dc.subject.authorUnited Statesen_US
dc.subject.authorConventional Military Balanceen_US
dc.subject.authorBalance of poweren_US
dc.subject.authorSouth Asiaen_US
dc.description.serviceLieutenant, United States Navyen_US
etd.thesisdegree.nameM.A. in National Security Affairsen_US
etd.thesisdegree.levelMastersen_US
etd.thesisdegree.disciplineNational Security Affairsen_US
etd.thesisdegree.grantorNaval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
etd.verifiednoen_US
dc.description.distributionstatementApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


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