Military intervention in identity group conflicts a social movement theory perspective on the Sunni insurgency in Iraq

Abstract

This thesis investigates why Iraq's Sunnis resorted to violent collective action, rather than non-violent political action, following Saddam's overthrow. Using social movement theory, I argue that decreasing political opportunity, existing mobilizing structures with violent repertoires, and effective framing of the opposition as kufr (non-Muslim) explain the emergence of Iraq's Sunni insurgency. I posit that Sunnis felt a profound grievance in the decreased political opportunity following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Furthermore, mobilization nearly always utilizes existing networks and adapts the characteristics of the physical spaces and organizational structures from which the movement emerges. I argue that the disbanded military and militant Islamist networks comprised the bulk of the first insurgent groups, and that these groups used their existing repertoires to shape Iraq's political environment. I then trace the frames used throughout the conflict, illustrating that the common theme is opposition to rule by kufr - whether it be Coalition nations or Iraqi Shi'a - and this provides a concrete target for the insurgency. Examined collectively, these three factors provide a sufficient explanation for the Sunni insurgents' turn to violence to address their political grievances. This argument stands in constrast to the clash of civilization and "Cosmic War" arguments, which offer insufficient explanations.