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dc.contributor.authorMoran, Daniel
dc.dateSeptember 2003
dc.date.accessioned2013-01-11T00:06:37Z
dc.date.available2013-01-11T00:06:37Z
dc.date.issued2003-09
dc.identifier.citationStrategic Insights, v.2, issue 9 (September 2003)
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/25463
dc.descriptionThis article appeared in Strategic Insights (September 2003), v.2 no.9en_US
dc.description.abstractMilitary planners and defense officials in Washington and Baghdad are widely reported to have believed that the recent war between the United States and Iraq would end in a general uprising by the Iraqi people. This surprising convergence of views between otherwise dissimilar adversaries has not attracted much comment, presumably because no uprising occurred. The Iraqi people did not swarm upon the invaders, drowning them in a river of blood, as Iraq's celebrated information minister, Muhammed Saeed al-Sahaf, insisted they would. Nor did they rise up in a final act of fury against the regime that had tortured and imprisoned them, as promised by the Pentagon-sponsored Iraqi opposition leader Ahmed Chalabi. Instead, Iraqi civilians seem to have done their best to stay out of the way of their own armed forces, whose disintegrating formations were magnets of destruction, as anyone could see. Conversely, most Iraqis greeted Coalition forces warily, perhaps from fear that any public sign of relief at Saddam's demise would put them at risk from remnant elements of the Old Regime, perhaps from natural apprehensions about what occupation and foreign rule would mean. All of which amounts to a generalized display of common sense, for which no explanation is required. This document discusses the consequences of an Iraqi uprising that would have been wholly negative.en_US
dc.publisherMonterey, California. Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.relation.ispartofStrategic Insights, v.2, issue 9 (September 2003)
dc.relation.ispartofseriesStrategic Insights
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.titleThe Uprising; Strategic Issues: v.2, issue 9 (September 2003)en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.contributor.corporateCenter for Contemporary Conflict
dc.contributor.corporateNaval Postgraduate School (U.S.) Monterey, California
dc.contributor.departmentNational Security Affairsen_US


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