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dc.contributor.advisorBreemer, Jan S.
dc.contributor.authorLeary, David Allan
dc.dateJune 1989
dc.date.accessioned2013-01-23T21:56:21Z
dc.date.available2013-01-23T21:56:21Z
dc.date.issued1989-06
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/26141
dc.descriptionApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited
dc.description.abstractThis thesis examines the impact a START agreement might have on United States and Soviet strategic nuclear forces. It then proposes an "optimum" post-START force mix for the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Thf current, as well as projected, post-START targeting policies are discussed. It is concluded that the impact of a START agreement on the current U.S. strategic targeting policy will be minimal. Although the target data base will not shrink as much as the forces tasked to cover it, a prioritization of targets is all that should be necessary with a post-START force. A START agreement will mean major reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces. As proposed in this thesis, only the ICBM leg of the Triad will require any major re-structuring. This would include the addition of mobile ICBM systems. The SLBM and bomber legs will feel minimal changes (i.e., retiring POSEIDON SSBNs and retiring or converting some older B-52s). It is recommended that the B-2 program be cancelled, and funding be redirected into the mobile ICBM systems. By doing so the United States could utilize technology available today to strengthen its forces and not gamble on the low observable technology which a "stealth" bomber might have.
dc.description.sponsorshipDefense Nuclear Agency, DNA MIPR 88-674
dc.description.urihttp://archive.org/details/optimizingpostst00lear
dc.format.extent80 p.en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherMonterey, California. Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.
dc.titleOptimizing the post-START U.S. strategic nuclear force mixen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.secondreaderTeti, Frank M.
dc.contributor.corporateNaval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
dc.contributor.departmentNational Security Affairs (NSA)
dc.subject.authorarms controlen_US
dc.subject.authorstrategic arms reduction talks (START)en_US
dc.subject.authorstrategic nuclear force balanceen_US
dc.subject.authorstrategic nuclear force structureen_US
dc.description.funderDefense Nuclear Agency, DNA MIPR 88-674
dc.description.serviceLieutenant Commander, United States Navy
etd.thesisdegree.nameM.A. in National Security Affairsen_US
etd.thesisdegree.levelMastersen_US
etd.thesisdegree.disciplineNational Security Affairsen_US
etd.thesisdegree.grantorNaval Postgraduate Schoolen_US


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