Coalition war and burden-sharing: the President vs the Congress

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Authors
Pierce, James A.
Subjects
Advisors
Abenheim, Donald
Date of Issue
1991-12
Date
December 1991
Publisher
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Language
en_US
Abstract
this thesis examines past U.S. approached to coalitions and efforts to forge alliances in peace and war in the 20th century. Specifically, it analyses the conflict between the executive and legislative branches with respect to coalition building and burden-sharing The thesis suggests that the amount of Congressional activism depends on the perception of an external threat among members of the legislative branch. Likewise, thesis highlights the tension between Congressional desires to impose the burden upon allies while retaining control over coalition policy and forces. The thesis concludes with a case study of Operation Desert Storm and burden-sharing. Finally, the author warns of dangerous precedent established by the shift in burden-sharing responsibilities in the recent past between the executive and legislative bodies.
Type
Thesis
Description
Series/Report No
Department
National Security Affairs (NSA)
Organization
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
Funder
Format
106 p.
Citation
Distribution Statement
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.
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