U.S. Army Guard and Reserves: beyond Desert Storm and into the future

Abstract

The United States Army, unlike the other services, relies heavily on its reserve components for reinforcing forces and for augmentation in the support areas. There are currently two heated debates taking place over the Guard and Reserves. One debate is taking place within the Army. The other debate is being heard on Capitol Hill as the Department of Defense continues to request for reductions in the politically well-connected Guard and Reserves. As the Army continues to draw down its forces and faces demands for further reductions, the number of Army reservists, as well as their roles and missions, will become even more controversial. This thesis begins with an examination of the intended role of the reserves as established in the Total Force Policy adopted in 1973. The discussion continues with the performance of the reserves during the Persian Gulf War, followed by an assessment of the role of the reserves in the New National Security Strategy. The congressional attitude towards the reserves is addressed, including a discussion of how the Army might meet the conditions of a hypothetical Base Force 11 proposal and its impact on the reserves. Prior to the conclusion, recommendations are offered for altering the roles, missions, and structure of the reserves to improve the effectiveness of the Total Army. U.S. Army Reserves, Army National Guard, New National Security Strategy, Deterrence, Forward Presence, Crisis Response, Reconstitution, Base Force, Congress, Total Force Policy, roundout, Capstone, Persian Gulf War