Verifying the Chemical Weapons Convention: the case for a United Nations verification agency.

Abstract

To successfully conclude a Chemical Weapons Convention, it is essential to establish a permanent United Nations verification agency. While the United States currently opposes a United Nations role in multilateral arms control verification, successes by the International Atomic Energy Agency in controlling nuclear weapons and the UN Special Commission in the disarmament of Iraq demonstrate a need for the United States to revise its position on this vital matter. Potential benefits of a permanent verification agency presented in this thesis center on the need for sharing heavy CWC verification costs, the unique challenges in monitoring multinational treaties, and the advantages of an in-place body to address difficult verification concerns prior to treaty implementation. Verifying a Chemical Weapons Convention will require tremendous financial resources and enhance the need for organizational efficiency and economy. A permanent UN verification agency could provide the forum for coordinating verification resources and advancing new proposals in arms control verification.