Publication:
Fixed-price-award-fee: an economic motivational, and contracting theory analysis

Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Authors
Schade, Don F.
Subjects
Fixed Price Award Fee
FPAF
award fee
pricing arrangement
incentive contract
contractor motivation
economics
contracting
acquisition
Advisors
Gates, William R.
Terasawa, Katsuaki L.
Date of Issue
1990-12
Date
December 1990
Publisher
Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
Language
Abstract
The award fee is a unique incentive structure that provides the government a method of subjective, after the fact evaluation of contractor performance and affords the Government additional flexibility to reward a contractor for above average performance. Additionally, the award fee is not subject to the disputes clause of a Government contract. Use of award fee serves to enhance contractor performance in areas of quality, production management, ingenuity, timeliness, and cost effectiveness. Currently, the award fee is mostly utilized under cost reimbursement contracts. In order to obtain the full benefit of the award fee, its use in fixed price contracts should be considered. An analysis from the perspective of economic theory, motivational theory, and contracting theory was conducted. In addition, perspectives from Government and private sector contracting personnel were obtained to determine the most effective utilization of an FPAF contract.
Type
Thesis
Description
Series/Report No
Department
Department of Administrative Sciences
Other Units
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
Funder
Format
viii, 68 p.
Citation
Distribution Statement
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.
Collections