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dc.contributor.advisorTeti, Frank M.
dc.contributor.authorKolbas, Patrick Joseph
dc.date.accessioned2013-02-15T23:30:18Z
dc.date.available2013-02-15T23:30:18Z
dc.date.issued1991-06
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/28016
dc.description.abstractThis thesis examines the implications for nuclear deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union brought about by the dramatic changes in the strategic environment during the 1980s. Specifically, it examines the potential for a new criteria of deterrence at significantly lower levels of strategic weapons. The analysis indicates that a targeting strategy which emphasizes economic and industrial facilities will deter the Soviet Union. This targeting strategy allows for a reduction to 1500 strategic weapons while maintaining the robustness of nuclear deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union. Using as its criteria arms race stability, breakout stability, crisis stability, verification, predictability, consequences of war, and the security of friends and allies, this thesis concludes that a force structure comprised of the Trident D-5 Submarine-launched ballistic missile and the B-2 bomber best ensures deterrence both against the Soviet Union and any other nuclear power regardless of changes in their political or ideological orientation. To provide maximum flexibility while negotiating the agreement and to hedge against a breakdown in U.S/Soviet relations prior to implementation, the thesis recommends a modernization program for U.S. strategic forces including funding for the restructured Strategic Defense Initiative which is now named Global Protection Against Limited Strikes. *Nuclear Deterrence, limited Nuclear Options, *Arms Control, Strategic Nuclear Weapons, STARTen_US
dc.description.urihttp://archive.org/details/beyondarmageddon1094528016
dc.format.extent96 p.;28 cm.en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherMonterey, California. Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.titleBeyond Armageddon: deterrence with lessen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.secondreaderTritten, James J.
dc.contributor.corporateNaval Postgraduate School
dc.contributor.schoolNaval Postgraduate School
dc.contributor.departmentNational Security Affairs (NSA)
dc.subject.authorNuclear Deterrenceen_US
dc.subject.authorLimited Nuclear Optionsen_US
dc.subject.authorArms Controlen_US
dc.subject.authorStrategic Nuclear Weaponsen_US
dc.subject.authorSTARTen_US
dc.description.serviceLieutenant, United States Navyen_US
etd.thesisdegree.nameM.A. in National Security Affairsen_US
etd.thesisdegree.levelMastersen_US
etd.thesisdegree.disciplineNational Security Affairsen_US
etd.thesisdegree.grantorNaval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.description.distributionstatementApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


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