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dc.contributor.authorTritten, James John
dc.date5/13/1991
dc.date.accessioned2013-02-27T23:22:47Z
dc.date.available2013-02-27T23:22:47Z
dc.date.issued1991-05-13
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/28676
dc.description.abstractProvides an analysis of President Bush's new national security strategy first unveiled in Aspen, Colorado on August 2, 1990, involving a mix of active, reserve, and reconstitutable forces, and General Colin Powell's "base" force. If implemented, the new strategy and force structure would return a significant amount of U.S. ground and air forces to the continental U.S. where most would be demobilized. In the event of a major crisis, the U.S. would rely on active and reserve forces for a contingency response much the same as has been done for Operation DESERT SHIELD. The new strategy is based upon a revised Soviet threat and new international security environment which allows us to assume two years warning of a major ground war in Europe. During this two year period, the U.S. would reconstitute additional military capability. Outline of all sources of new strategy and force structure, the "base" force, transportation requirements, and whether or not the U.S. will retain a unilateral capability for overseas Intervention. Discussion of parallel NATO initiatives. Discussion of major issues resulting from this new proposed strategy and force structure, including: is the new strategy real, defining new goals and objectives in both programming and war planning, the effect of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, new requirements for intelligence, requirements for decision-making, setting technological requirements, research & development, investment strategy and industrial conversion, reconstitution, stockpiles, impact upon DoD organization, a transition period, arms control, and new requirements for military operations research and analysis. Concludes that there are four major critical factors upon which the new strategy depends; (1), the behavior of the USSR, (2), the behavior of allies and the Congress, (3), the ability of the intelligence community to meet new challenges, and (4), the ability of industry to meet new demands. Concludes that even if it can be shown that industry cannot meet new demands, the strategy may still be useful. Section on specific impact on the Navy. The new strategy is not simply an adjustment to existing defense doctrine or strategy but rather a fundamental revision to the way the U.S. has approached defense since 1945.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipSponsored by the Director, Net Assessment and Competitive Strategies Office and Strategic Planning Branch, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC; the Defense Policy Office, National Security Council Staff, Washington, DC; and the Defense Nuclear Agency HQ DNA/NASF, Alexandria, VA.en_US
dc.description.urihttp://archive.org/details/americapromisest9103atrit
dc.format.extent1 v. (various pagings) ; 28 cm.en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherMonterey, California. Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.rightsApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited.en_US
dc.subject.lcshMILITARY FORCES (UNITED STATES)en_US
dc.titleAmerica Promises to Come Back: A New National Strategyen_US
dc.typeTechnical Reporten_US
dc.contributor.corporateNaval Postgraduate School (U.S.).
dc.contributor.departmentNational Security Affairs.en_US
dc.subject.authorNational Security Strategyen_US
dc.subject.authorAspen Strategyen_US
dc.subject.authorBase Forceen_US
dc.description.funderMIPR DDWAM00035, 90005, 90038en_US
dc.description.recognitionNAen_US
dc.identifier.oclcocm23892750
dc.identifier.npsreportNPS-NS-91-003A


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