America Promises to Come Back: A New National Strategy
Tritten, James John
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An analysis of President Bush's new national security strategy first unveiled in Aspen, Colorado on August 2, 1990, involving a mix of active, reserve, and reconstitutable forces, and General Colin Powell's "base" force. If implemented, the new strategy and force structure would return significant U.S. ground and air forces to the continental U.S. where most would be demobilized. In the event of a major crisis, the U.S. would rely on active and reserve forces for a contingency response, much as was done for Operation DESERT SHIELD. The new strategy is based upon a revised Soviet threat, and new international security environment which assumes a two-year warning of a major ground war in Europe. During this period, the U.S. would reconstitute additional military capability. Outline of all sources of new strategy and force structure, the "base" force, transportation requirements, and whether or not the U.S. will retain a unilateral capability for overseas intervention. Discussion of parallel NATO initiatives. Discussion of major issues resulting from this proposed strategy and force structure, including: is the new strategy real, defining new goals and objectives in both programming and war planning, the effect of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, new requirement for intelligence, requirements for decision-making, setting technological requirement research & development, investment strategy and industrial conversion, reconstitution stockpiles, impact upon DoD organization, a transition period, arms control, and new requirements for military operations research and analysis. Concludes that there are four major critical factors upon which the new strategy depends; (1) the behavior of the USSR (2) the behavior of allies and the Congress (3) the ability of the intelligence community to meet new challenges, and (4) the ability of industry to meet new demands. Conclusions that, even if it can be shown that industry cannot meet new demands, the strategy may still be useful. Section on specific impact on the Navy Department. The new strategy is not simply an adjustment to existing defense doctrine or strategy but rather a fundamental revision to the way the U.S. has approached defense since 1945.
NPS Report NumberNPS-NS-91-003B
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