NATO deterrence and defense after the INF treaty

Abstract

The treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States eliminating a whole class of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe raises a number of questions about NATO's future ability to deter Warsaw Pact aggression. Future choices on Alliance strategy and doctrine will be influenced by a variety of factors, including the image of new thinking in Soviet security policy enunciated by General Secretary Gorbachev, changing West European opinion toward the use of nuclear weapons for NATO deterrence, the complications inherent in further nuclear and conventional arms control negotiations, assessments of the current conventional arms balance in Europe, and ongoing questions about NATO cohesion as well as the continued coupling of American security with that of her European allies. In the post-INF environment it may well be that U.S. Navy nuclear assets will assume an increasingly important role, particularly the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile/Nuclear (TLAM/N). The TLAM/N has many attractive attributes that can be supportive of NATO deterrence of the WTO, but there are also a number of unresolved questions to be addressed concerning this particular weapons system. Modernization of NATO's land-based short-range nuclear forces (SNF), such as the Lance missile, is also seen by many as critical to the maintenance of Alliance security in the aftermath of INF. (sdw)