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dc.contributor.authorAckley, Richard T.
dc.date1990-04
dc.date.accessioned2013-02-27T23:29:08Z
dc.date.available2013-02-27T23:29:08Z
dc.date.issued1990-04
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/29132
dc.description.abstractThis report advocates not agreeing to ballistic missile warhead sublimits in START in order to place maximum reliance on the Trident/D-5 strategic weapon system. With reduced numbers in our post-START inventory, it is mandatory to emphasize our most survivable, capable, flexible and affordable systems for deterrence and defense. Keywords: Sea launched missiles; Arms control limitations; START(Strategic Arms Reduction Talks); Strategic nuclear weaponsen_US
dc.description.sponsorshipDefense Nuclear Agencyen_US
dc.description.urihttp://archive.org/details/tridentssbnsinst00ackl
dc.format.extent1 v. (various pagings) ; 28 cm.en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherMonterey, California. Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.rightsApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited.en_US
dc.subject.lcshARMS CONTROLen_US
dc.titleTrident SSBNs in STARTen_US
dc.typeTechnical Reporten_US
dc.contributor.corporateNaval Postgraduate School (U.S.).
dc.contributor.departmentNational Security Affairsen_US
dc.subject.authorStart, Strategic Nuclear, Trident, Navy Nuclearen_US
dc.description.funderMIPR 90-581en_US
dc.description.recognitionNAen_US
dc.identifier.oclca194695
dc.identifier.npsreportNPS-56-90-008


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