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dc.contributor.authorEagle, James N.
dc.contributor.authorWashburn, Alan R.
dc.date1989-03
dc.date.accessioned2013-03-07T21:52:24Z
dc.date.available2013-03-07T21:52:24Z
dc.date.issued1989-03
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/29787
dc.description.abstractCumulative search-evasion games (CSEGs) are two-person zero-sum search-evasion games where play proceeds throughout some specified period without interim feedback to either of the two players. Each player moves according to a preselected plan. If (Xt,Yt) are the positions of the two players at time t, then the game's payoff is the sum over t from 1 to T of A(Xt,Yt,t). Additionally, all paths must be connected. That is, the finite set of positions available for a player in any time period depends on the position selected by that player in the previous time period. One player attempts to select a mixed strategy over the feasible T-time period paths to maximize the expected payoff. The other minimizes. Two solution procedures are given. One uses the Brown- Robinson method of fictitious play and the other linear programming. An example problem is solved using both procedures. Keywords: Search strategies; Prohibiting; Mathematical models. (kt)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipPrepared for: Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.en_US
dc.description.urihttp://archive.org/details/cumulativesearch00eagl
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherMonterey, California. Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.subject.lcshMATHEMATICAL MODELSen_US
dc.subject.lcshMATRIX GAMESen_US
dc.titleCumulative search-evasion games (CSEGs)en_US
dc.typeTechnical Reporten_US
dc.contributor.corporateNaval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
dc.description.funderprepared in conjunction with research conducted under the Naval Postgraduate School Research Council Programen_US
dc.identifier.npsreportNPS-55-89-04
dc.description.distributionstatementApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


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