Determining a cost-effective mix of UAV-USV-manned platforms to achieve a desired level of surveillance in a congested strait

Abstract

This thesis develops concepts of operations (CONOPS) and analytical models to determine the surveillance assets for a congested strait. Two maritime security threats (Reds) are a hijacked large ship carrying dangerous cargo or a SB manned by terrorists attempting to cause damage to other vessels or the port. The Red SB can either conduct a direct attack or a sneak attack by hiding among other neutral SBs. The defense force consists of shore-based sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), and patrol craft (PC). The shore-based radar and the UAVs classify unidentified vessels as suspicious or not suspicious and suspicious SB must be inspected by a USV or PC. Analytical models are introduced to analyze requirements for numbers of surveillance assets and to assess the effectiveness of the CONOPS to achieve a desired probability of detecting and intercepting the threat. They incorporate both differential equations and probabilistic arguments. Results indicate that if the UAVs generate many false positives then the USVs and PCs have a higher workload which decreases the probability of detecting a threat. USVs and PCs should give a high priority to inspecting suspicious SBs rather than identifying unsuspicious SBs to achieve a higher probability of detecting a threat.