Naval doctrine: an analysis of the effectiveness of NDP 1 and NDP 6

Abstract

The purpose of doctrine is to unite beliefs and actions. The Armed Forces are not always successful in achieving true interoperability; one cause for the disconnection between them is that, while the Services develop forces, they do not employ them. The Combatant commands employ what the Services provide. Accordingly, one of doctrine's most valuable roles is assuring the integration of the developer and operator. This thesis examines the successfulness of Naval and Joint Warfare and Command and Control doctrine at the interface of development and employment. The thesis concludes that Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, and Joint Publication 6, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations, present an integrated, focused framework. The ties to (and between) the corresponding Naval Doctrine Publications are weaker. Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare, the Naval Doctrine Command's first attempt at issuing doctrine, contains several weaknesses that detract from its stated purpose of establishing a framework for more detailed doctrine. Naval Doctrine Publication 6, Naval Command and Control, does meet its purpose and is a much stronger document, but could be further strengthened by incorporating a discussion of how Naval Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence systems will be employed to support Naval Command and Control.