Economic sanctions : effectiveness as a foreign policy tool in the case of the former Yugoslavia

Abstract

Unwilling to use military force, the Western powers, acting through the UN Security Council, relied heavily on economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) REFERRED TO AS FRY (S/M) to end the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The breakup of the former Yugoslavia resulted in wars of secession in Slovenia, Croatia, and finally, Bosnia- Herzegovina. Warring factions divided themselves up along ethnic lines with the Serbians being labeled as the aggressors in the conflict. Economic sanctions were implemented against the FRY (S/M) in May 1992. Economic sanctions were devastating to the FRY (S/M) economy. By 1993, FRY (S/M) President Slobodan Milosevic indicated his support for the Vance%Owen Peace Plan in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions. The Bosnian Serbs failed to support the peace plan, resulting in the tightening of sanctions on the FRY (S/M). The intent of the tightened sanctions was to force Milosevic to represent the Bosnian-Serbs in future peace negotiations. This strategy worked as indicated by the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, which ended the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This work examines the role economic sanctions had in ending that conflict.