Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorKoenig, Gerald S.
dc.date01-Apr-07
dc.date.accessioned2013-05-08T21:13:28Z
dc.date.available2013-05-08T21:13:28Z
dc.date.issued2007-04-01
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10945/33178
dc.descriptionProceedings Paper (for Acquisition Research Program)en_US
dc.description.abstractCurrent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) budget scoring rules cheat taxpayers and warfighters by ignoring the high cost of not acquiring cost-effective upgrades to critical combat weapons. Treating paid-over-time procurements as if they are paid-up-front budget outlays necessarily perpetuates waste and inefficiency where we can least afford it: on the modern battlefield. As a result, the current acquisition process for such upgrades involves a simplistic, two-step process. First, determine if paying the entire cost up-front of an upgrade is less expensive than the net present value of paying for the upgrade over time. Once paying up-front is ''discovered'' to be the cheaper option (as nearly always occurs), the next step is to abandon the upgrade as soon as it fails to compete successfully for scarce procurement budget dollars. An extremely conscientious program official may repeat this process for a number of budget cycles. But in the end, the outcome is predictable. The game is just rigged that way.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipNaval Postgraduate School Acquisition Research Programen_US
dc.titleThe Folly of Consequence-Free Budget Scoringen_US
dc.typeTechnical Reporten_US
dc.contributor.departmentAcquisition Management
dc.contributor.departmentOther Research Faculty
dc.subject.authorBudget Scoringen_US
dc.subject.authorCongressional Budget Office (CBO) Budget Scoring Rules, Cost-effective Upgradesen_US
dc.identifier.npsreportNPS-AM-07-023
dc.description.distributionstatementApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record