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dc.contributor.authorMoszoro, Marian
dc.contributor.authorSpiller, Pablo T.
dc.date30-Apr-12
dc.date.accessioned2013-05-08T21:28:13Z
dc.date.available2013-05-08T21:28:13Z
dc.date.issued2012-04-30
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/33893
dc.descriptionProceedings Paper (for Acquisition Research Program)en_US
dc.description.abstractThe lack of flexibility in public procurement design and implementation is a political risk adaptation by which public agents limit hazards from opportunistic third parties''political opponents, competitors, and interest groups''and externalize the associated adaptation costs to the public at large. Public agents endogenize the likelihood of opportunistic challenge, lowering third parties'' expected gains and increasing litigation costs. We provide a comprehensible theoretical framework with empirically testable predictions: Scrutiny increases public contracting efficiency in costly litigation environments, concentrated (politically) contestable markets, and with upwardly biased beliefs about benefits of challenge.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipNaval Postgraduate School Acquisition Research Programen_US
dc.titleThird-Party Opportunism and the (In)Efficiency of Public Contractsen_US
dc.typeTechnical Reporten_US
dc.contributor.departmentAcquisition Management
dc.contributor.departmentOther Research Faculty
dc.subject.authorThird-party Opportunismen_US
dc.subject.authorpublic procurement, contracts, third-party opportunismen_US
dc.identifier.npsreportNPS-AM-12-C9P09R01-061
dc.description.distributionstatementApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


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