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dc.contributor.authorWang, Chong
dc.contributor.otherAcquisition Research Program
dc.date.accessioned2013-07-24T16:02:01Z
dc.date.available2013-07-24T16:02:01Z
dc.date.issued2013-04-01
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10945/34580
dc.descriptionDisclaimer: The views represented in this report are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy position of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the federal government.en_US
dc.descriptionExcerpt from the Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium Cost Estimatingen_US
dc.description.abstractThe research presented in this report was supported by the Acquisition Research Program of the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School. To request defense acquisition research, to become a research sponsor, or to print additional copies of reports, please contact any of the staff listed on the Acquisition Research Program website (www.acquisitionresearch.net).en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipUSD(AT&L)
dc.description.sponsorshipPrepared for the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CAen_US
dc.description.sponsorshipNaval Postgraduate School Acquisition Research Programen_US
dc.publisherMonterey, California. Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.titlePolitical Connections of the Boards of Directors and Defense Contractors' Excessive Profitsen_US
dc.typeTechnical Reporten_US
dc.contributor.departmentGraduate School of Business & Public Policy (GSBPP)
dc.identifier.npsreportNPS-CE-13-C10P04R03-056
dc.description.distributionstatementApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


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