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dc.contributor.advisorFox, William P.
dc.contributor.advisorOwen, Guillermo
dc.contributor.authorGaugush, David
dc.contributor.authorMerkl, Gregory
dc.contributor.authorThompson, Nicholas
dc.dateJun-13
dc.date.accessioned2013-08-01T16:51:36Z
dc.date.available2013-08-01T16:51:36Z
dc.date.issued2013-06
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/34666
dc.descriptionApproved for public release; distribution is unlimiteden_US
dc.description.abstractThis work proposes a mathematical paradigm for modeling the rise and fall of coalitions during intrastate conflicts. It proposes that misalignment of preferences within constituencies drives instability, which can lead to revolution. To arrive at preference for an issue, the model considers two components: ideology and fervor. It shows that ideology tends to remain static while fervor changes rapidly. With the preferences of a society mapped according to constituents ideology and fervor, the model then considers how coalitions exercise control in their quests for dominance. The model builds upon the foundation of expert thought on intrastate conflict. It uses their generally qualitative assessments and employs measurable data and linear algebra to give a more formal depiction of the dynamics at play. Mapping populations in this manner may give insight into optimal strategies for eliciting stability or instability in a state. Using a hypothetical country in a developing revolution, the work implements the map to depict a governments attempts to stabilize a devolving intrastate system. It shows how rival coalitions can rapidly rise from irrelevance to preeminence by manipulating fervor. The work concludes by depicting the impacts of various third-party strategies for intervening in intrastate conflicts.en_US
dc.publisherMonterey, California: Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. As such, it is in the public domain, and under the provisions of Title 17, United States Code, Section 105, may not be copyrighted.en_US
dc.titleMapping populations: an objective measurement of revolutionary dynamicsen_US
dc.contributor.departmentDefense Analysis
dc.subject.authorPopulation mapen_US
dc.subject.authorcoalitionen_US
dc.subject.authorstrategyen_US
dc.subject.authorgamesen_US
dc.subject.authoreconometricen_US
dc.subject.authoreconomyen_US
dc.subject.authorcounterinsurgencyen_US
dc.subject.authorinsurgencyen_US
dc.subject.authorintrastate conflicten_US
dc.subject.authorinterstate conflicten_US
dc.subject.authorfervoren_US
dc.subject.authormathematical modelingen_US
dc.subject.authorhuman domainen_US
dc.description.serviceMajor, United States Armyen_US
etd.thesisdegree.nameMaster of Science In Defense Analysis and Master of Arts Applied Mathematicsen_US
etd.thesisdegree.levelMastersen_US
etd.thesisdegree.disciplineDefense Analysisen_US
etd.thesisdegree.disciplineApplied Mathematicsen_US


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