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dc.contributor.advisorGiordano, Frank
dc.contributor.authorWittmer, Luke A.
dc.dateJun-13
dc.date.accessioned2013-08-01T16:52:01Z
dc.date.available2013-08-01T16:52:01Z
dc.date.issued2013-06
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/34764
dc.descriptionApproved for public release; distribution is unlimiteden_US
dc.description.abstractIn the current global environment, interstate coercion methods are used to compel behavior modification amongst state and state-sponsored actors. Traditional compellence is commonly considered in its overt, diplomatic manifestation. However, in the age of low-intensity conflict where domestic and international exigencies often constrain U.S. coercive policy options, covert methods in the form of unconventional warfare, subversion, sabotage and other associated paramilitary and political actions are occasionally pursued as the means to support the U.S.s coercive overtures. Under the rubric of covert coercion there are state-level decision frames, strategies, and resistance force alliance conditions that contribute to either the success or failure of covert coercion ventures that utilize unconventional warfare approaches. This analysis utilizes game theoretic models, as well as insights from prospect theory, to explain the conditions under which unconventional warfare could prove a viable U.S. coercive policy option.en_US
dc.publisherMonterey, California: Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. As such, it is in the public domain, and under the provisions of Title 17, United States Code, Section 105, may not be copyrighted.en_US
dc.titleCovert coercion: a formal analysis of unconventional warfare as an interstate coercive policy optionen_US
dc.contributor.secondreaderBlanken, Leo
dc.contributor.departmentDefense Analysis
dc.subject.authorCoercionen_US
dc.subject.authorCompellenceen_US
dc.subject.authorCoercive Diplomacyen_US
dc.subject.authorUnconventional Warfareen_US
dc.subject.authorCovert Actionen_US
dc.subject.authorParamilitary Actionen_US
dc.subject.authorPolitical Actionen_US
dc.subject.authorProxy Warfareen_US
dc.subject.authorPolicy Objectiveen_US
dc.subject.authorGame Theoryen_US
dc.subject.authorDecision Theoryen_US
dc.subject.authorExpected Utilityen_US
dc.subject.authorProspect Theoryen_US
dc.subject.authorIranen_US
dc.subject.authorLebanonen_US
dc.subject.authorIraqen_US
dc.subject.authorCuban Missile Crisisen_US
dc.subject.authorTibeten_US
dc.subject.authorAfghanistanen_US
dc.subject.authorSoviet Union (USSR)en_US
dc.subject.authorNicaraguaen_US
dc.subject.authorContraen_US
dc.subject.authorKorean Waren_US
dc.subject.authorWorld War IIen_US
dc.description.serviceMajor, United States Armyen_US
etd.thesisdegree.nameMaster of Scienceen_US
etd.thesisdegree.nameMaster of Science in Defense Analysisen_US
etd.thesisdegree.levelMastersen_US
etd.thesisdegree.disciplineDefense Analysisen_US


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