The requirements for acquisition and logistics integration an examination of reliability management within the Marine Corps acquisition process

Abstract

Combat system reliability is central to creating combat power, determining logistics supportability requirements, and determining systems' total ownership costs, yet the Marine Corps typically monitors only operational availability. While acceptable operational availability may be achieved through intensive maintenance and the stocking of needed repair parts in large quantities, this increases the logistics burden on the combat commander and is costly in terms of personnel, time, and funding. Data required to compare system reliability requirements in source documents, such as the Operational Requirements Document and the acquisition contract, to achieved reliability of fielded systems is generally not collected, maintained, or available. Contractual obligations to attain system reliability, if any, could not be enforced, and any increase in sustainability costs associated with unmet reliability thresholds is borne by the Marine Corps, draining scarce funding from other priorities. This research interprets data and perspectives, as collected from a reliability management survey administered to acquisition workforce professional s, and collectively summarizes common inhibitors of effective reliability management, why they occur, lessons learned, and potential methods for mitigating the inherent risks. The results ascertain a variety of technical, programmatic, managerial, incentive, and procedural issues that the Marine Corps encounters concerning system reliability requirements and achievement.