Feedback Models for Collaboration and Trust in Crisis Response Networks

Abstract

Scholars have devoted increasing efforts to understanding crisis response networks (Denning 2006a, 2006b; Stephenson and Schnitzer 2006), especially in the case of networks comprised of disparate members who acknowledge no higher organizational authority. Coordination within disaster response networks is difficult for several reasons, including the chaotic nature of the crisis, a need for the various organizations to balance shared goals (crisis amelioration) and organization-specific goals, and the lack of a central organizing authority (Denning 2006a, 2006b; Stephenson and Schnitzer 2006). More recently, scholars (Stephenson and Schnitzer 2006) have suggested crisis response networks might be able to coordinate effectively in the absence of a central organizing authority. Grounded in general system theory (e.g., Bertalanffy 1962, 1968; Kast and Rosenzweig 1972; Senge 1990; Weinberg 1975), and particularly the use of feedback loops (Masuch 1985; Richardson 1999), this paper seeks to understand whether feedback loops comprised of reciprocal resource commitments can engender greater trust and commitment among organizations responding to a crisis. This paper describes a campaign of experimentation set in the Maritime Interdiction Operation, an experimental campaign operated by the Naval Postgraduate School's Center for Network Innovation and Experimentation.