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dc.contributor.authorRowe, Neil C.
dc.contributor.authorCusty, E. John
dc.contributor.authorDuong, Binh T.
dc.date.accessioned2013-09-18T16:37:10Z
dc.date.available2013-09-18T16:37:10Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Computers, 2 (2), 2007, pp. 25-36.
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/36428
dc.descriptionThis paper appeared in the Journal of Computers, 2 (2), 2007, pp. 25-36.en_US
dc.description.abstractHoneypots are computer systems designed for no purpose other than recording attacks on them. Cyber-attackers avoid them since honeypots jeopardize the secrecy of attack methods and it is hard to launch attacks from them. This suggests that a computer system might pretend to be a honeypot to scare away attackers, reducing the number of attacks and their severity. This could be done on ordinary computer systems as a kind of “vaccination” of those systems, to create what we call “fake honeypots”. After some background, we examine this idea here from three perspectives. We develop a mathematical model of what would make an attacker go away. We report experiments with deliberate distortions on text to see at what point people could detect deception, and discover they can respond to subtle clues. We then report experiments with real attackers against a honeypot. Results show that attacks on it decreased over time which may indicate that attackers are being scared away, irregular outages of the honeypot stimulated attacks, and other changes occurred in response to our manipulations. We conclude with some speculation about the escalation of honeypot-antihoneypot techniques.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipsupported by NSF under the Cyber Trust Programen_US
dc.publisherMonterey, California. Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.titleDefending Cyberspace with Fake Honeypotsen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.contributor.corporateCyber Trust Program
dc.subject.authorhoneypotsen_US
dc.subject.authordeceptionen_US
dc.subject.authorintrusion-detection systemsen_US
dc.subject.authordefenseen_US
dc.subject.authorsignaturesen_US
dc.description.distributionstatementApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


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