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dc.contributor.authorRowe, Neil C.
dc.contributor.authorAuguston, Mikhail
dc.contributor.authorDrusinsky, Doron
dc.contributor.authorMichael, J. Bret
dc.dateJune 2004
dc.date.accessioned2013-09-20T17:14:51Z
dc.date.available2013-09-20T17:14:51Z
dc.date.issued2004-06
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/36583
dc.descriptionThis paper appeared in the Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, San Diego, CA, June 2004.en_US
dc.description.abstractOur research group has been broadly studying the use of deliberate deception by software to foil attacks on information systems. This can provide a second line of defense when access controls have been breached or against insider attacks. The thousands of new attacks being discovered every year that subvert access controls say that such a second line of defense is desperately needed. We have developed a number of demonstration systems, including a fake directory system intended to waste the time of spies, a Web information resource that delays suspicious requests, a modified file-download utility that pretends to succumb to a buffer overflow, and a tool for systematically modifying an operating system to insert deceptive responses. We are also developing an associated theory of deception that can be used to analyze and create offensive and defensive deceptions, with especial attention to reasoning about time using temporal logic. We conclude with some discussion of the legal implications of deception by computers.en_US
dc.publisherMonterey, California. Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.rightsApproved for public release, distribution unlimiteden_US
dc.titleResearch on Deception in Defense of Information Systemsen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.contributor.departmentComputer Science Department


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