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dc.contributor.authorBrown, G. G.
dc.contributor.authorCarlyle, M.
dc.contributor.authorAbdul-Ghaffar, A.
dc.contributor.authorKline, J.
dc.date2011
dc.date.accessioned2013-09-25T23:03:12Z
dc.date.available2013-09-25T23:03:12Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.citationBrown, G. G., Carlyle, M., Abdul-Ghaffar, A. and Kline, J., 2011, "A Defender-Attacker Optimization of Port Radar Surveillance," Naval Research Logistics, 58(3), pp.223-235.
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/36735
dc.descriptionNaval Research Logistics, 58(3), pp.223-235.en_US
dc.descriptionCenter for Infrastructure Defense (CID) Paper.en_US
dc.description.abstractThe U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border Patrol, Marine Corps, and Navy have deployed several hundred port patrol vessels to protect waterways, U.S. Navy ships and other high-value assets in ports world-wide. Each vessel has an armed crew of four, is relatively fast, and features a surface search radar, radios, and a machine gun. These vessels coordinate surveillance patrols in groups of two or four. We developed a mathematical model for advantageously positioning these vessels, and possibly shore-based radar too, to minimize the probability that an intelligent adversary in one or more speedboats will evade detection while mounting an attack. Attackers can use elevated obstructions to evade radar detection in their attack paths, and ports feature many such restrictions to navigation and observation. A key, but realistic assumption complicates planning: the attackers will be aware of defensive positions and capabilities in advance of mounting their attack. The defender-attacker optimization suggests plans here for a fictitious port, the port of Hong Kong, and the U.S. Navy Fifth Fleet Headquarters in Bahrain. In these cases, the defender can almost certainly detect any attack, even though the attacker, observing defender prepositioning, plans clever, and evasive attack tracks.en_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. As such, it is in the public domain, and under the provisions of Title 17, United States Code, Section 105, may not be copyrighted.en_US
dc.titleA Defender-Attacker Optimization of Port Radar Surveillanceen_US
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Operations Research
dc.subject.authorMaritime and Port Securityen_US


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