Solving Defender-Attacker-Defender Models for Infrastructure Defense
Alderson, David L.
Brown, Gerald G.
Carlyle, W. Matthew
Wood, R. Kevin
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This paper (a) describes a defender-attacker-defender sequential game model (DAD) to plan defenses for an infrastructure system that will enhance that system's resilience against attacks for an intelligent adversary, (b) describes a realistic formulation of DAD for defending a transportation network, (c) develops a decomposition algorithm for solving this instance of DAD and others, and (d) demonstrates the solution of a small transportation-network example. A DAD model generally evaluates system operation through the solution of an optimization model, and the decomposition algorithm developed here requires only that this system-operation model be continuous and convex. For example, our transportation-network example incorporates a congestion model with a (convex) nonlinear objective function and linear constraints.
In Operations Research, Computing, and Homeland Defense, R.K. Wood and R.F. Dell, editors, INFORMS, Hanover, MD, pp. 28-49.The article of record as published may be located at http://dx.doi.org10.1287/ics.2011.0047
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