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dc.contributor.authorAlderson, David L.
dc.contributor.authorBrown, Gerald G.
dc.contributor.authorCarlyle, W. Matthew
dc.contributor.authorWood, R. Kevin
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-15T22:45:23Z
dc.date.available2013-10-15T22:45:23Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.citationAlderson, D.L., Brown, G.G., Carlyle, W.M., and Wood, R.K., 2011, Solving Defender-Attacker-Defender Models for Infrastructure Defense, in Operations Research, Computing, and Homeland Defense, R.K. Wood and R.F. Dell, editors, INFORMS, Hanover, MD, pp. 28-49.
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10945/36936
dc.descriptionIn Operations Research, Computing, and Homeland Defense, R.K. Wood and R.F. Dell, editors, INFORMS, Hanover, MD, pp. 28-49.en_US
dc.descriptionThe article of record as published may be located at http://dx.doi.org10.1287/ics.2011.0047en_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper (a) describes a defender-attacker-defender sequential game model (DAD) to plan defenses for an infrastructure system that will enhance that system's resilience against attacks for an intelligent adversary, (b) describes a realistic formulation of DAD for defending a transportation network, (c) develops a decomposition algorithm for solving this instance of DAD and others, and (d) demonstrates the solution of a small transportation-network example. A DAD model generally evaluates system operation through the solution of an optimization model, and the decomposition algorithm developed here requires only that this system-operation model be continuous and convex. For example, our transportation-network example incorporates a congestion model with a (convex) nonlinear objective function and linear constraints.en_US
dc.rightsdefined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.titleSolving Defender-Attacker-Defender Models for Infrastructure Defenseen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.contributor.departmentOperations Research (OR)
dc.subject.authorinfrastructure defense; infrastructure protection; homeland defense; intelligent adversary; game theory; optimization; defender-attacker-defender model; trilevel game; Stackelberg game; probabilistic risk analysis; traffic equilibriumen_US


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