An Institutional Analysis of Tiebout Competition and Government Monopoly Power
Seagren, Chad W.
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I present an agent-based model to measure the efficiency of different political institutions with respect to facilitating collective decisions that yield the greatest satisfaction among constituents. In addition, I examine spacial separation between parties as a surrogate for competition within jurisdictions and as a possible measure for the extent of monopoly power the local government might exert. First I extend Kollman, Miller, & Page’s seminal computational model of electoral competition to include additional voting institutions and more complex and realistic landscapes of voter preferences. In the model, heterogeneous agents select among jurisdictions the one that offers the most satisfactory package of government services. Voters move costlessly between jurisdictions while competitive, yet imperfectly informed, parties adapt their platforms in an effort to achieve electoral success. Major aspects of previous research are confirmed, such as the inherent stability of the electoral system, however, certain conclusions regarding the relative performance of certain voting rules are found to be dependent upon voter preference distributions. Implications regarding the ability of local governments to leverage their monopoly positions are then explored, as are several avenues for future research that appear fruitful.
The article of record as published may be located at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1555213
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