Integrating monetary and non-monetary reenlistment incentives utilizing the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM)
Zimmerman, Brooke Maura
Gates, William R.
Coughlan, Peter J.
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This research addressed the potential retention and cost impacts of providing an optimal individualized portfolio of non-monetary and monetary incentives to influence reenlistment and retention behavior in enlisted Sailors by exploring three mechanisms for administrating enlisted retention: a purely monetary auction, a Universal Incentive Package (UIP) auction, and the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM). The mechanisms were simulated, their outcomes compared and their respective strengths and weaknesses were explored. CRAM clearly outperformed the monetary and UIP auctions. Cost savings to the Navy ranged from 25 to 80% over monetary incentives alone. Additionally, this research addressed the force-diversifying potential of CRAM. It was shown, for the sample used, that offering certain non-monetary incentives changed the demographic mix of Sailors retained. By allowing Sailors to choose only those benefits, which suit them, the Navy can eliminate the waste associated with unwanted benefits while at the same time empowering its members.
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The combinatorial retention auction mechanism (CRAM): integrating monetary and non-monetary reenlistment incentives Coughlan, Peter J.; Gates, William R.; Zimmerman, Brooke M. (Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2011-11); NPS-GSBPP-11-013This research addresses the potential retention and cost impacts of providing an optimal individualized portfolio of non-monetary and monetary incentives to influence reenlistment and retention behavioral in enlisted ...
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