Integration of information operations in combat

Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether the U.S. military is fully integrating information operations in combat operations. Using the organizational theories of Henry Mintzberg and the work of Richard Daft as one frame of reference, and the information theories of Claude Shannon, John Diebold, and Martin Libicki as the second frame of reference, this thesis produced testable propositions to determine which theory had a greater ability to explain the degree of integration as seen in the four case studies of Operation Joint Guard/Forge (Bosnia), Operation Enduring Freedom - Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom - Philippines, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. This study concludes that the both organizational and information theories help explain how and why military commanders integrate IO successfully into combat operations insights drawn from this study include: without the proper command atmosphere, the integration of information operations will simply not occur. Commanders who do not believe in the usefulness of IO will focus on kinetic operations instead of a full spectrum view using all the elements of combat power; and The increased speed and reliability of information that passes from the human network (physical) to the computer network, and from the tactical to the strategic levels, allows commanders and staffs alike to understand and integrate IO into combat operations more effectively.